



# Built for Integrity <sup>Colorado</sup>

How to make American elections transparent and trustworthy



Apr 2022

# Overview

- **Principles**
- **The Election System We Have**
- **The Election System We Need**
- **What you can do**

# Five Principles for Election Integrity

1. Elections *belong* to citizens.
2. Integrity *first & above all* – transparency=*truth*
3. Any law, rule, or act of government that reduces or risks election integrity is *void*.
4. Decentralization is *critical* to self-governance.
5. Complexity breeds and hides corruption.

*Elections will be trustworthy only when CITIZENS are in control*

# The Election System in Colorado

## Voter Rolls

## Election Management

## Voting

## Tabulation

## Reporting

## Auditing

### Flaws and vulnerabilities in the systems

- SCORE insecure /inaccurate
- Secret or no cybersec testing
- Foreign IP connections
- 10+yrs of severe vuls
- ERIC +4x new voter growth=4x CO pop. growth
- Voter ID = sham for registration & voting

- Mail-in/Drop-box chain-of-custody weak/nonexistent
- No ballot ID# – *anyone* can print ∞ qty
- Vendor EMS cyber vuls
- BallotTrax/USPS enable predictive feedback loop for fraud

- Voter ID=sham
- Sig. ver=sham
- Voting system cyber vuls
- Voting systems manipulate, degrade ballot images, can be and ARE configured to delete records
- TXT2Cure ID so lax, ANY ballot can be cured

- Black Box count
  - Controlled by vendors – no gov verification - they don't even try
  - Machines duplicate /discard images and Cast Vote Records
- Centralization= no local control

- Reporting process controlled by vendors
- Gov allows foreign company control of data/totals
- Focused on media demand, not integrity

- RLA is *SAMPLING*
  - Opaque code
  - Random?
  - Detects *defects*, not fraud
- SCORE voter rolls NEVER audited
- No forensic ballot/env. exam
- Only 1 county hand-recounted: 6/10 of 1% of vote
- No checks for lost/changed votes

# This is not a theory...

OCTOBER 16, 2020 | JUDICIAL WATCH

## New Judicial Watch Study Finds 353 U.S. Counties in 29 States with Voter Registration Rates Exceeding 100%

*Michigan BOMBHELL: Forensic Audit Finds Dominion Machines Designed to Flip Votes, Were Set At 68.05% Error Rate*

Image Credits: [cmanphot](#)

By [Jamie White](#)

AZ Auditors Say Over 17,000 Duplicate Ballots Found in Maricopa County, 1.5 Times What Biden Won By



By [Michael Austin](#) • September 24, 2021 at 2:49pm

U.S. NEWS AUGUST 29, 2016 / 8:46 AM / UPDATED 5 YEARS AGO

## FBI detects breaches against two state voter systems

By [Dustin Volz](#), [Jim Finkle](#)

4 MIN READ



**BREAKING: THEY GOT CAUGHT!**  
**Investigators Have Video of 240 Leftist Operatives in Georgia Dumping Thousands of Ballots from Backpacks into Drop Boxes in Middle of the Night!**

By [Jim Hoft](#)

Published September 3, 2021 at 11:05am

[Comment](#)



SCORE

leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/audits/1503p\_department\_of\_state\_performance\_audit\_november\_2015.pdf

ent\_of\_state\_performance\_audit\_november\_2015.pdf 39 / 62 | - 150% + | confidential 4/5

# CHAPTER 3

## 2015 THE SCORE SYSTEM AND IT CONTROLS

During our audit work, we identified certain matters that are not included in this audit report that were reported in a separate confidential report dated November 2015.

nass.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/synack-white-paper-nass-winter21.pdf

synack-white-paper-nass-winter21.pdf 1 / 3 | - 150% +

2020

In the summer of 2020, soon after red team researchers from a managed network of ethical hackers [began examining the State of Colorado's voter registration website](#) for potential vulnerabilities, they spotted something alarming. Problems with the website's CAPTCHA challenge, a common first line of defense online, could have opened up the site to a distributed

In total, the red team network discovered seven vulnerabilities in Colorado's election-related systems as well as the Secretary of State's official website. Colorado patched all of them well ahead of Election Day using the detailed reports they received in real time from the provider's Crowdsourced Security Platform.

# Mail-In Ballots

Adequate Signature Verification  
According to CO SecState

bs/elections/docs/SignatureVerificationGuide.pdf

1 / 20 | 100%

## SIGNATURE VERIFICATION GUIDE

Hours of training



20 pages

Adequate Signature Verification  
According to Professionals

Months of training  
Years of experience


 <p>Steven A. Slyter <b>Forensic Signature Examination</b> ★★★★☆ 4 ratings</p>		
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111 pages

# Mail-In Ballots



What Election Judges See





# COLORADO CANVASSING RESULTS



# Reviewer Credentials

**Ph.D. in Economics; MS in Mathematics; MA in International Economics; MA in Education; Retired USAF, LtCol (served 25yrs); Assistant Professor in Mathematics (USAFA) and Assistant Professor in Economics (USAFA); Financial & Economic advisor to Deputy Assist Secretary of the Air Force (Pentagon); Additional Experience includes Flight Test Analyst, Satellite Tester, and Laser Lab Intern**

**Certified Public Accountant; 10+ Years of Accounting Experience**

**Master's and Ph.D. in Mathematical Statistics; 30+ years as a Professional Statistician**

**40+ years of software development and engineering expertise; Experience in Marketing, Real Estate, and Voter Data Acquisition and Development**


**25+ years Active-Duty military, including command of military installations and operational forces, staff assignments, including Office of the Secretary of Defense, and formal research for Department of Defense; BA, Political Science/MAS, Aeronautical Science/MA, National Security Affairs; operational test manager, director, analyst; trained in Scientific Test and Analysis Techniques (STAT), statistical research.**

**Exemplary prior US military service; Bachelor and Master's Degrees in Arts, Sciences, and Information Technologies; 40 Years of Combined Experience: Programming, Systems Engineering, Product Development, Curriculum Planning, Operations Analysis, and Systems Architecture; Additional Experience: Fortune 500 Companies, Corporate & Commercial education, Higher Education, Communications, Video Game/Simulations, and defense industries.**

**27+ years of software development and engineering expertise; Experience in Healthcare, Jail Systems, and Marketing development**

**Master's in Business Analytics; Certified Analytics Professional; 10+ Years of Analytical and Financial Experience**

# Statistical Methodology – Stratified Sampling



## Advantages

- **Lower cost compared to simple random sampling**
- **Sample is less variable**
- **Estimates more precise**


# Total Issues Found – All Four Counties

Sample Information				Affidavit Rates			Voters Negatively Impacted		
County	Registered Voters	Houses Canvassed	Confirmed Residences	Best Estimate Discrepancy Rate	High Estimate Discrepancy Rate	Low Estimate Discrepancy Rate	Best Estimate Voters Negatively Impacted	High Estimate Voters Negatively Impacted	Low Estimate Voters Negatively Impacted
Total	1,128,337	9,472	4,601	8.0%	11.0%	5.0%	90,002	123,852	56,152

Estimates are based on a 99% confidence rate with a 3% margin of error

## Discrepancy Percent (Best Estimate) by Category

Total Counties (El Paso, Weld, Pueblo, and Douglas)





# Total Issues Found – Sample of Affidavit Comments

Address is a liquor store

Address is an intersection surrounded by commercial

Address is commercial

Address is commercial

Address is commercial

Address is commercial & appears vacant

Voters stated they voted in TX and not CO. Ballot record reflects that they voted in CO  
Voters stated they voted in TX and not CO. Ballot record reflects that they voted in CO  
Voter stated they did not vote in the 2020 election, however, records show they did.  
Voter stated they did not vote in the 2020 election, however, records show they did.  
Voter said they did not vote in 2020 Election Ballot Returned 10/30

Voter voted No ballot counted

Voter voted Ballot not counted

Voter stated they did vote but ballot was not counted per the SoS records

Voter stated they did vote but ballot was not counted per the SoS records

Voter stated they did vote but ballot was not counted per the SoS records

Voter mailed ballot but her voted not recorded in SOS list

Subject voted in person but his vote was not recorded by the county

voted as Democrat not unaffiliated

was registered as DEM but affiliation changed to Unaffiliated

Voter is Rep but County Lists him as Dem

Voter is Rep but County Lists him as Dem

is a Democrat not unaffiliated

Affiliation changed to UAF without voter authorization.

This is a County Clerk Voting Dept Location NOT A Residence

This is a County Clerk Voting Dept Location NOT A Residence


This is a County Clerk Voting Dept Location NOT A Residence

This is a County Clerk Building not a residence?

# How Can We Extrapolate to The Counties?

Probability density of VOS by canvass response

Red = Distribution of Canvassed Voters & Blue = Distribution of Entire County.




- The distribution of the voters canvassed in each county approximates the distribution for all voters in each county
- Given that this is comparing samples to a total population, there will be minor differences due to sampling error (which is common)

# Total Issues Found – Extrapolated to Entire State

Sample Information				Affidavit Rates			Voters Negatively Impacted		
County	Registered Voters	Houses Canvassed	Confirmed Residences	Best Estimate Discrepancy Rate	High Estimate Discrepancy Rate	Low Estimate Discrepancy Rate	Best Estimate Voters Negatively Impacted	High Estimate Voters Negatively Impacted	Low Estimate Voters Negatively Impacted
Total	4,201,820	9,472	4,601	8.0%	11.0%	5.0%	335,159	461,214	209,105


Estimates are based on a 99% confidence rate with a 3% margin of error



# How Can We Extrapolate to The State?

## Probability density of VOS

Canvassed Counties versus Total Registered Voters



- The distribution of the voter opportunity score for the counties canvassed approximates the distribution of the voter opportunity score for the entire state
- As noted before, given that this is comparing samples to a total population, there will be minor differences due to sampling error (which is common)

### \*\* SPECIAL NOTE \*\*

- Colorado Secretary of State's data includes voter history for some voters that is earlier than what is possible based on the age recorded for that voter as evidenced by the fact that voter opportunity scores  $> 1$  exist



# Black Box Voting Machines

- Bev Harris, Black Box Voting, 2004:  
“With computerized voting, the certified and sworn officials step aside and let technicians, and sometimes the county computer guy, tell us the election results.”
- Gould report, Mesa County, September 2021 (like Antrim/Maricopa):  
“(CRS) 1-5-601.5 requires...compliance with...2002 Voting System Standards...this forensic examination found that a substantially large number of these requirements have not been met.”
- Halderman Declaration, 1:17-CV-2989-AT, Curling v. Raffensberger:  
“My July 1, 2021, expert report describes...flaws that would allow attackers to install malicious software on the ICX,...with temporary physical access...or remotely from (EMS)...Nor do these problems affect (GA) alone...It will be used for accessible voting in...Colorado”

# “But Where is the Evidence?” #1

Mesa Cty, CO Voting Systems Forensic Examination Report #1, 11 Sep 21

- 1) Election-related data explicitly required to be preserved, as stated in the 2002 VSS criteria referenced in this section, has been destroyed in violation of Federal and State law, and
- 2) Due to non-compliance with the 2002 VSS requirements, these voting systems and accompanying vendor-provided, Colorado Secretary of state-approved procedures for county use cannot have met the certification requirements of the State of Colorado, and should not have been certified for use in the state..

# “But Where is the OTHER Evidence?” #2

Mesa Cty, CO Voting Systems Forensic Examination Report #2, 28 Feb 22

1. **The electronic voting systems contained 36 separate wireless devices**
2. **The Dominion system was set up to automatically delete audit records**
3. **The Secretary of State systematically deleted required system log files during the “Trusted Build**
4. **Uncertified software was illegally installed on the Mesa County election server**
5. **The Mesa County electronic voting system is configured to allow any computer in the world to connect to the Election Management System (EMS) server**
6. **The Mesa County electronic voting system violates the federal Voting System Standards (VSS)**

# Says who?

**Doug Gould is an expert in Cyber Security with more than 40 years' experience in the field. Doug retired from AT&T after 31 years, where he served as Chief Cyber Security Strategist. He currently serves as Chief Technical Officer at CyberTeamUS.**



Doug began at AT&T with Bell Laboratories, serving in the Semiconductor Laser Development department and later in the Bell Lab's Security Group, as a delegate to the Bell Labs' Unix Systems

Subcommittee, was an early pioneer in the field of Computer Forensics and won a Bell Labs Innovation Award. At AT&T he designed the security architecture for one of the largest states in the US, consulted with cabinets of the nations' largest

- Security Device Technologies (Firewalls, IDS/IPS, DLP, SIEMs, Encryption, VPNs, Unified Threat Management, etc., Enterprise, Remote and Cloud)
- Information Forensics (Computer & Network Forensics)
- Public Key Infrastructures
- Identity and Access Management
- Authentication, Authorization and Access Control (incl Biometrics)
- Regulatory Compliance
- Physical Security (Threat Assessment/Risk

# “But Where is the OTHER Evidence?” #3

## Mesa Cty, CO Voting Systems Forensic Examination Report #3, 19 Mar 22

1. **Unauthorized creation of new election databases (Nov. '20 General Election)... digital “reloading” of 20,346 ballot records...original voter intent...from paper ballots unknown; 5,567 ballots/58 batches’ digital records not copied, but votes included**
2. **Unauthorized creation of new election databases (2021 Grand Junction Municipal Election)...digital reloading of 2,974 ballot records...obscuring original voter intent...4,458 ballots/46 batches’ digital records not copied, but votes included**
3. **Secure hash algorithm (.sha) files required for each digital ballot image were missing, making the authenticity and ballot-level records for those ballots impossible to verify**
4. **The true total vote count in Mesa County for those two elections cannot be accurately calculated from records in the databases of the county’s voting system.**
5. **No function or feature...that could be executed inadvertently or deliberately by a local election official that would cause this combination of events to occur, especially within the time frame of the events...**
6. **Trusted Build update on the EMS server in May 2021...directed by the CO SecState, destroyed all data on the EMS hard drive, including batch and ballot records that evidenced the creation of new databases and reprocessing of ballot records**
7. **Demonstrates critical security failure...manipulation undetectable to election officials, observers, judges, citizens - need both cyber and database management system expertise, and total access to database records/log files**

# Says who?

Jeffrey O'Donnell is a Full Stack software and database developer and analyst. He holds Bachelor's degrees in Computer Science and Mathematics from the University of Pittsburgh. Over the last 40 years, Mr. O'Donnell has worked and consulted for numerous private sector corporations, including Rockwell International, Westinghouse Electric Nuclear, General Defense, U.S. Steel, Mellon Bank, IOTA 360, and the Penn State Applied Research Laboratory. For several years he also delivered and created computer science curriculum for the Community College of Allegheny County. For the last two decades, Mr. O'Donnell has developed numerous "big data" analysis systems, including systems to provide short-term stock market investors with new types of research and predictive analytics. He currently is President of Qest Development, a full-service software consulting and publishing company, and is Chief Information Officer of Ordros Analytics, which specializes in election analytics of all types.

# Says who?

Dr. Walter C. Daugherty is a computer consultant and also Senior Lecturer Emeritus in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at Texas A&M University. He graduated from Oklahoma Christian University with a degree in mathematics, and then earned master's and doctor's degrees from Harvard University, which he attended on a Prize Fellowship from the National Science Foundation. As a computer expert he has consulted for major national and international firms, and for government agencies. He helped develop the national computer keyboard standard and invented integrated user training within computer applications as well as various electronic computer interfaces. As a computer science and engineering teacher and researcher, he has published 26 research articles from over \$2.8 million in funded research projects, plus conference papers and other publications. He taught many areas of computer science and engineering for 37 years (32 years at Texas A&M University), including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, programming and software design, and cyber-ethics. At Harvard he received the Bowdoin Prize and medal for writing, and in 2015 was named a Distinguished Alumnus of Oklahoma Christian University. He is a life member of the Association for Computing Machinery and American MENSA.

# But Wait, There's More!

- Colorado's Dominion Voting Systems:
  - Democracy Suite 5.11-CO/5.13
  - EMS Server/Workstations; Adjudication Workstations; ICC; ICX; ICVA
- Maricopa Cty, AZ:
  - Democracy Suite 5.5B
  - EMS Server/Workstations; Adjudication Workstations; ICC; ICX; ICP; ICVA



# “But where is the other evidence?”



## Arizona Senate Audit

- Withheld Devices and Data
- Cyber Security Issues
- Hardware Configuration Control
- File Deletions
- Failure to Preserve Election Artifacts
- Anonymous Logins
- Listening Ports and Attempted Connections on Bootup
- Internet Connections and History

# “But where is the other evidence?”



Arizona Senate Audit

## Cyber Security Issues

- Failed to Perform Basic OS Patch Management
- Failed to Update AntiVirus Definitions
- EAC Certification Defense is NOT Valid In View of the Evidence
  - 4 .exe Files Created After Dominion Software Install
  - 45 .exe Files Modified After Dominion Software Install
  - 377 .dll Files Created After Dominion Software Install
  - 1053 .dll Files Modified After Dominion Software Install
- Log Management - Failed to Preserve Security Logs
- Credential Management – Shared Accounts and Common Passwords
- Failed to Establish and Monitor Host Baseline
- Failed to Establish and Monitor Network Communications Baseline

# Says who?



## 🕒 Ben Cotton

CEO and Founder at [CyFIR](#)

**Location:** Washington D.C. Metro Area

[ADD TO MY LISTS](#)

[MORE](#) ▾

Ben Cotton is the President, CEO and founder of Cytech Services, an industry leading computer forensics and incident response firm serving both public and private industry. Prior to founding CyTech in 2002, Ben was a twenty-one year veteran of the US Army, Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Mr. Cotton served in both unclassified and classified units fighting the Global War on Terrorism, specializing in sensitive site and digital device exploitation, Computer Network Attack (CNA), and Computer Network Defense (CND). While on active duty—in addition to being a fully qualified operator—Mr. Cotton was a technical visionary and pioneer in Cyber Security and Computer Forensics for the US Government and the SOCOM. Ben is a plank holder for the SOCOM capabilities that now exist within these technical areas. Ben holds a Masters of Science in Information Technology Management and has also earned numerous technical certifications, including the CISSP and other industry-recognized computer forensic and incident response certifications.

“But Where is the OTHER Evidence?”

- USEIP’s Colorado Canvassing Report
- USEIP.org
- This is why NAACP/LWV/Mi Familia Vota are suing USEIP

“But, but, but...”

# Voter-fraud conspiracy theorists meet with county officials

PREV

By CHARLES ASHBY Charles.Ashby@gjsentinel.com Sep 2, 2021 Updated Sep 2, 2021

“The specific request was to allow her forensic team to ‘go over the imaging,’ but at the meeting we were told they couldn’t share the imaging with us because of the ongoing criminal investigation,” Rowland said.

“The criminal investigation didn’t start until mid-August, but they’ve had the images since May,” Rowland added. “If evidence really exists, that proves a County’s elections was compromised, it should have immediately been taken to the district attorney or the sheriff. That should have happened day one.”

“But, but, but...”

← FEATURED  
PREV

# Officials counter false election claims

By CHARLES ASHBY Charles.Ashby@gjsentinel.com Oct 31, 2021 Updated Nov 2, 2021

Citing a report that Peters said she commissioned examining those images, which were taken before and after the trusted build, she claims that nearly 29,000 files were deleted. The only files that were deleted, however, were computer files that have nothing to do with elections, the Secretary of State's Office says.

As has occurred in previous elections, ballots from the fall election will undergo a “forensic” risk-limiting audit, one that could take weeks before the results are officially certified, Williams said.

CC: email: cody.davis@mesacounty.us (Cody Davis), email: scott.mcinnis@mesacounty.us (Scott McInnis), email: "stephanie.reecy@mesacounty.us Stephanie Reecy"

Janet:

Off the record, you were awesome.

On the record, any comment for publication about this morning's session?

Thanks,

Charles

Since my testimony is public record it might be interesting for an enterprising reporter to check and quote the actual testimony I provided. Or not. Up to you.

Wayne

**From:** CHARLES ASHBY <charles.ashby@gjsentinel.com>

**Sent:** Thursday, August 19, 2021 6:53 PM

**To:** waynewilliams@comcast.net

**Subject:** Re: Correction


# Unaccountable Criminality

- Interfered w/election officials' discharge of their official duty by prohibiting backups (CRS 1-13-701)
- Certified 4 voting system versions w/out testing by accredited voting system testing lab. (CRS 1-5-608.5)
- Violated certification of voting systems with installation of uncertified, untested software. (CRS 1-5-618)
- Allowed use of improperly certified voting systems in elections (CRS 1-5-612)
- Certified election results from despite the conduct of elections on illegally-certified systems with unauthorized software. (CRS 1-10-105)
- Destroyed election records. (CRS 1-7-802)
- Violated 8 CCR 1505-1 (her OWN rules) re: random seed, multiple years

# Put Up or Shut Up?

Pueblo Chieftain, 3 April 2022:

Pueblo County Clerk and Recorder Gilbert “Bo” Ortiz joined a bipartisan group of clerks from across the state in Denver on Sunday to call on critics who have claimed that Colorado’s election practices are fraudulent to back up their allegations with evidence. “We call on the individuals behind these allegations and ongoing disinformation to provide actual evidence of problems within our system to law enforcement, either through county district attorneys, or even directly through an outreach to the Colorado General Attorney,” Weld County Clerk Carly Koppes told reporters at the Denver County Elections Division.



CRS § 1-13-101(1) Any person may file an affidavit with the district attorney stating the name of any person who has violated any of the provisions of this code and stating the facts which constitute the alleged offense. Upon the filing of such affidavit, the district attorney shall forthwith investigate, and, if reasonable grounds appear therefor, he shall prosecute the violator.



(2) The attorney general shall have equal power with district attorneys to file and prosecute informations or complaints against any persons for violating any of the provisions of this code.



# The Election System We Have

- **Centralized, vulnerable, dirty voter rolls**
- **Vulnerable mail-in ballots & lax ID**
- **Vulnerable black-box vote counting**
- **Vulnerable vendor-controlled reporting**
- **Vulnerable black-box election audits**
- **No way to verify HOW your vote counted**

*Vulnerable to fake voters, fake ballots, fake counts*

# The Election System We Need

Component	Prevents		
	Fake Voters	Fake Ballots	Fake Counts
Start over: Local-controlled, clean voter rolls	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
In-person, election DAY voting w/gov. photo ID	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Precinct hand-count of numbered ballots under live-streamed, archived HD video		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Precincts certify and report vote count to precinct <b>VOTERS</b> , then Report certified count to counties			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Counties tally precinct counts ON VIDEO, report certified tally to voters/states			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
States tally counties' tallies, report/certify to voters			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

# What You Can Do

- **Share the evidence – demand public officials do their duty**
- **Tell County Commissioners you want to stop using black-box voting systems**
- **Affidavits – coming!**
- **Get involved – BFI Action Plan**

*Elections belong to US. WE must restore election integrity.*

# The Ask

	1. County-Controlled Voter Rolls	2. End Mail-In Voting	3. Eliminate Electronic Voting Machines	4. In-Person Register & Vote, w/Gov. Photo ID
A. Citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure clerks, commissioners, legislators</li> <li>b. Bring suit</li> <li>c. Recall resisters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure legislators</li> <li>b. Bring suit</li> <li>c. Recall resisters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure commissioners</li> <li>b. Recall resisters</li> <li>c. Volunteer to hand-count</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure clerks, commissioners, legislators</li> <li>b. Bring suit</li> <li>c. Recall resisters</li> </ul>
B. Boards of County Commissioners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure legislators</li> <li>b. Bring suit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure legislators</li> <li>b. Bring suit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Vote:eliminate electronic voting machines</li> <li>b. Direct hand-count</li> <li>c. De-couple local elections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Pressure legislators</li> <li>b. Bring suit</li> </ul>
C. Legislators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Modify CRS</li> <li>b. Direct audit of elections, systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Modify CRS</li> <li>b. Direct audit of elections, systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Modify CRS</li> <li>b. Direct audit of elections, systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Modify CRS</li> <li>b. Direct audit of elections, systems</li> </ul>
D. Prosecutors /Courts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Investigate evidence of criminal violations</li> <li>b. Hear evidence and rule for integrity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Investigate evidence of criminal violations</li> <li>b. Hear evidence and rule for integrity</li> </ul>	None.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Investigate evidence of criminal violations</li> <li>b. Hear evidence and rule for integrity</li> </ul>

# Join the Cause



<https://causeofamerica.org/concierge/>

# The World, According to “Election Experts”

# “No Incident of Fraud or Misconduct”

- **“Election-Related data explicitly required to be preserved”** (2002 VSS, Vol 1, para 2.2.4.1, 2.2.5.3, 4.3, 4.4.3, and 6.5.5) **“has been destroyed in violation of Federal and State law”** (Preservation required by 52 U.S.C. § 20701 and CRS § 1-7-802).
- **“Due to non-compliance with the 2002 VSS requirements, these voting systems and accompanying vendor-provided, Colorado Secretary of State-approved procedures for county use cannot have met the certification requirements of the State of Colorado, and should not have been certified for use in the state.”**
  - **2002 VSS (per CRS 1-5-601.5)** requires voting systems generate/preserve log files
    - The Dominion system was set up to automatically delete audit records
    - Secretary of State systematically deleted required system log files during the “Trusted Build”
  - DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO system did meet 2002 VSS requirements, but the **Secretary of State falsely and illegally certified** that it did.
  - Uncertified software was illegally installed on the Mesa County election server
  - The Mesa County electronic voting system is configured to allow any computer in the world to connect to the Election Management System (EMS) server

“We believe there’s a strategy behind this...”

- “...to spread fear, and to scare people and to create chaos...”
- “...they want to go back to voting on just one day...”
- “...they would like all counting of ballots to happen by hand on one day and be canvassed the day after the election...”
- “...they also want to get rid of mail ballots...”
- “...they want to go back to precinct polling places...”
  
- “...ironically, the solutions they’re talking about will have a **catastrophic effect** on our elections here in Colorado...”



# The “Catastrophic Effect” - UOCAVA

- **“First of all, it will significantly decrease access to the ballot...”**
- **“It will have the potential impact of disenfranchising our military voters...”**
- CRS § 1-8.3-110(2): “A covered voter who requests that a ballot and balloting materials be sent to the voter by electronic transmission may choose facsimile transmission or electronic mail delivery, or, if offered by the voter's jurisdiction, other electronic means...”
- CRS § 1-8.3-111: “To be valid, a ballot shall be received by the appropriate local election official not later than the close of the polls, or the voter shall submit the ballot for mailing, electronic transmission, or other authorized means of delivery not later than 7:00 p.m. mountain time on the date of the election.”

# The “Catastrophic Effect” - Disability

- **“...For our voters with disabilities...right now, we have at least 2 weeks of in-person voting and 3 weeks with your mail-in ballot...to allow a voter with a disability to vote independently and without assistance which is required by Federal law...”**
- 52 U.S. Code § 10508 - Voting assistance for blind, disabled or illiterate persons
  - “Any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.”

# The “Catastrophic Effect” – Error-Rate

- “...at the very base, the thought is that a hand-count has at least a **2% error rate**”
- "*Post-Election Auditing... Effects of Election Procedure and Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency and Auditor Satisfaction and Confidence,*" 5 Mar 2012, Election Law Journal
  - “Based on the processing of the ballots, the researchers found a **one-half to 1 percent error rate for the "read and mark" method, and up to a 2 percent error rate for the "sort and stack" method.**”
- “In accordance with Election Rule 25.2.2 (a), the Secretary of State established a **risk limit of 4%** for the comparison risk-limiting audit (RLA) of the November 3, 2020 General Election.”

<https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2010.0098>

*Michigan BOMBSHELL: Forensic Audit Finds Dominion Machines Designed to Flip Votes, Were Set At 68.05% Error Rate*

# The “Catastrophic Effect” – The Demonstration

- “...our systems count ballots accurately. We can demonstrate that, we have demonstrated that after every single election...we have extensive pre-election testing, we have our risk-limiting audit...”
- 8 CCR 1505-1, Rule 11.3.2 – Logic and Accuracy Test
- **The “Hat Trick,”** In its simplest form, the trick works by placing the hat on a specially made table or chest. Both the hat, and the surface it is placed on, will have a hidden opening in them, through which an object stored in a compartment in the table or chest can be pulled. Alternatively, the performer can produce an item hidden in their sleeve using sleight of hand and misdirection. This eliminates the need to place the hat on a surface, and also allows the performer to give the hat to an audience member for inspection... This trick is also traditionally performed for children, since it is a basic trick with basic props.”

“...when I see the F-35, I don’t see a fighter. I see a computer that happens to fly.”

# The “Catastrophic Effect” – Municipal Elections

- “...if you think about...a lot of our elections, especially our municipal elections in odd years, it’s not uncommon for those elections to come down to one or two votes and in some cases be tied, so why would we ever accept a system that starts with an assumption of a 2% error rate?”
- Mesa Report #3: “The same unauthorized creation of new election databases occurred during the 2021 Grand Junction Municipal Election on March 30, 2021, followed by the digital reloading of 2,974 ballot records, making the original voter intent recorded on those ballots unknown. In addition, 4,458 ballots in 46 batches did not have their digital records copied to the new database, although the votes from the ballots in those batches were recorded in the Main election database.”

# The “Catastrophic Effect” – Security

- “...right now in our central count facilities we have tight chain of custody, we have camera coverage on every part of the operation...there is no way that you can secure those 200 polling places for hand count and have the same types of chain of custody, the same security as you can in one central count facility.”



# The “Catastrophic Effect” – Too Old to Count?

- “...the average age of our election judges is a little bit up there. Probably 60s and 70s. So to ask people after working a 14 or 15 hour day to then turn around and count a 2 to 3 page ballot with 50-some races on it and have it all done by the next morning or the next day...no ability to audit, no ability to double check...”
- 1. Shifts. Obviously.
- 2. One-page ballot.
- 3. Perfectly transparent ability for ANYBODY to audit. At home.

**Americans are pretty bad at math.  
Especially young Americans.**

By [Catherine Rampell](#)


February 4, 2015

“Interestingly, it’s the younger cohorts who are dragging U.S. numeracy scores down. Americans aged 55 to 65 did okay, if not exactly spectacularly, when compared with their counterparts in other countries.”

# “What they’re not experts in...is elections...”

- “...they don’t understand election systems, election laws, and election processes...”
- “...29,000 election records were deleted and not retained...that’s not true...Records required for retention under Federal and State election law are not deleted as part of the trusted build process...counties back up the required records”

Figure 9 - EMS Server (5.13) Web Server Log Files After



## Preparation & notes

- **Backup any election projects on your voting system to removeable media before our arrival.**

Prior to the Dominion update, there were 240 log files in this folder. After the update, there are only 3 log files showing and 3 (partial) remnants of previously used log files in File Slack space.



# “...not operating system records...”

- “...what’s important here is that the records required for retention under federal law are voting system records, not operating system records...”

2002 Voting System Standards, Vol. 1, para 2.2.5.3:

Second, operating system audit shall be enabled for all session openings and closings, for all connection openings and closings, for all process executions and terminations, and for the alteration or deletion of any memory or file object. This ensures the accuracy and completeness of election data stored on the system. It also ensures the existence of an audit record of any person or process altering or deleting system data or election data.



“...at any point, the Clerk in Mesa could have...”

- “...I think it’s very telling that the people who put out these reports, including...at any point, the Clerk in Mesa could have gone back and done a hand recount of those ballots...”

email: "cody.davis@mesacounty.us Cody Davis" Monday, September 20, 2021 at 7:36:38 AM Mountain Daylight Time  
 To: email: "cowboyrickw@gmail.com Richard Weber"  
 Cc: email: "janet.rowland@mesacounty.us Janet Rowland" , email: "scott.mcinnis@mesacounty.us Scott McInnis"

Rick,  
 Overall, I think you did a fair job of analysis. My only addition would be about the timing of the RLA. I'm sure we could get enough people to hand count the ballots right away, but that is not the plan. Preliminary dominion results will be available on election night. The certification of the vote (including ballots allowed extra time) will need to happen by Nov. 8. The following Monday (Nov 15) the State will tell us how robust the risk-limiting audit must be. If the race is close, the larger the RLA will be. Sometimes, based on certain results, the RLA might have to be run 2-3 times to satisfy state requirements. For the entire time, proper order and placement of ballots must be maintained. We cannot start hand counting the ballots when randomly selected ballots are being pulled for the RLA. Hand counts often end with ballots getting out of order, which could be detrimental to an accurate RLA. So the RLA must be completely finished before the hand count begins. The goal is to start the hand count by Nov. 14 and then complete it by Dec 17. Then in January, we can begin having those same ballots counted. If we have a ballot, if we decide to have clear ballot count the actual ballots and not images of the ballots (still on a quote from Clear ballot, but counting the physical ballots could be rather costly). To reiterate, all of these recounting and validation processes cannot be concurrently performed given their needed access to the ballots and our need to ensure custody and order of ballots. Hope this helps.  
 Thank you for your efforts, Rick. It is much appreciated.  
**Cody Davis**  
**Mesa County Commissioner, District 1**

From: [REDACTED]  
 Sent: Monday, March 15, 2021 12:28 PM  
 To: 'Chuck Broerman' <ChuckBroerman@elpasoco.com>; 'Angela Leath' <AngelaLeath@elpasoco.com>  
 Cc: [REDACTED]  
 Subject: FORMAL REQUEST FOR PUBLIC AUDIT OF EL PASO COUNTY 2020 GENERAL ELECTION

**TO: EL PASO COUNTY CLERK & RECORDER**

To restore the public’s confidence in El Paso County’s Election system, a group of El Paso County volunteer citizens would like to:


- Physically audit **77,000 paper ballots** = approximately 20% of the 383,000+ ballots cast in the 2020 Presidential General Election – Presidential race only

To do that we will identify the batches by DATES RETURNED, to include, but not limited to:

# “A testing lab can only lose its accreditation...”

- “...by a vote of the Federal Election Assistance Commissioners...”
- 52 U.S.C. § 20971(b)(2)(A) “...no laboratory may be accredited...unless its accreditation is approved by a vote of the Commission.”
- Voting System Testing Laboratory Program Manual, Versions 1.0, July 2008, and 2.0, 31 May 15

**3.8. Expiration and Renewal of Accreditation.** A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL’s accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by



# “...this whole thing...that it never happened...”



**U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION**  
633 3rd St. NW, Suite 200  
Washington, DC 20001

## Notice of Clarification

### **NOC 21-01: VSTL Accreditation Status**

Issued by Program Director on July 23, 2021

### **Section of Manual to Be Clarified:**

Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0:

- 3.8. Expiration and Renewal of Accreditation.** A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter, no earlier than 60 days before the accreditation expiration date and no later than 30 days before that date. Laboratories that timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending. VSTLs in good standing shall also retain their accreditation should circumstances leave the EAC without a quorum to conduct the vote required under Section 3.5.5.

### Pro V&V

Pro V&V was accredited by the EAC on February 24, 2015. Federal law provides that EAC accreditation of a voting system test laboratory cannot be revoked unless the EAC Commissioners vote to revoke the accreditation: “The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission.” 52 U.S. Code § 20971(c)(2). The EAC has never voted to revoke the accreditation of Pro V&V. Pro V&V has undergone continuing accreditation assessments and had new accreditation certificate issued on February 1, 2021.

**Due to administrative error** during 2017-2019, the EAC did not issue an updated certificate to Pro V&V causing confusion with some people concerning their good standing status. Even though the EAC failed to reissue the certificate, Pro V&V's audit was completed in 2018 and again in early 2021 as the scheduled audit of Pro V&V in 2020 was postponed due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. Despite the challenges outlined above, throughout this period, Pro V&V and SLI Compliance remained in good standing with the requirements of our program and retained their accreditation. **In addition, the EAC has placed appropriate procedures and qualified staff to oversee this aspect of the program ensuring the continued quality monitoring of the Testing and Certification program is robust and in place.**

# “...wireless components on our voting systems”

- “...this is known. These systems go through Federal certification and state certification with it known that these devices have that capability. However, here in Colorado we make sure that capability is disabled through the Trusted Build process...”

## Report #3

Is configured with 36 wireless devices, which represent an extreme and unnecessary vulnerability, and which may be exploited to obtain unauthorized access from external devices, networks, and the Internet.

## 5.11-CO Test Report

### Section 6: Telecommunications Requirements

The requirements in this section were not tested during this test campaign.

## 5.13 Test Report

### Section 6: Telecommunications Requirements

The requirements in this section were not tested due to Colorado Rule 20.6.1(f) prohibiting the use of modems.

[https://sbg.colorado.gov/sites/sbg/files/61%20Tech%20Doc\\_2.pdf](https://sbg.colorado.gov/sites/sbg/files/61%20Tech%20Doc_2.pdf)

The WLAN must be segmented from the environment that contains gaming data. This segmentation must be done with a firewall that has stateful packet inspection. Virtual local area networks (VLAN) do not segment the wireless network appropriately and are not approved. In addition to the firewall there should be a system that monitors and prevents unauthorized access by inspecting the header and payload of each packet. This is typically done by an Intrusion Detection/Intrusion Prevention system (IDS/IPS).

[https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/general\\_wireless\\_policy/2012-09-21/finding/V-19813](https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/general_wireless_policy/2012-09-21/finding/V-19813)

*Computers with an embedded wireless system must have the radio removed before the computer is used to transfer, receive, store, or process classified information.*

Overview				
Finding ID	Version	Rule ID	IA Controls	Severity
V-19813	WIR0045	SV-21976r3_rule	ECWN-1	High

# “...2019, when (SoS) took over access to BIOS”

NIST Special Publication 800-147 – BIOS Protection Guidelines

Unauthorized modification of BIOS firmware by malicious software constitutes a significant threat because of the BIOS’s unique and privileged position within the PC architecture. A malicious BIOS modification could be part of a sophisticated, targeted attack on an organization—either a permanent denial of service (if the BIOS is corrupted) or a persistent malware presence (if the BIOS is implanted with malware). The move from conventional BIOS implementations to implementations based on the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) may make it easier for malware to target the BIOS in a widespread fashion, as these BIOS implementations are based on a common specification.

- Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC) “The technology allows you to deploy, monitor, manage, configure, update, and troubleshoot Dell EMC systems from any location without using any agents or an operating system.”



## PowerEdge R640

Service Tag: HMVCVD3 | Express Ser

Support Services:  Next Business Da

[Change product](#)

385-BBKS : iDRAC9, Express		
PART NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY
FTKXD	INFO,OOBE,iDRAC9,DF,14G	1
GPJRH	INFO,iDRAC9,14G,EXP	1

# “New components for our voting systems...”

- “...do not have these wireless components...so this is something that you already see the industry moving away from...”

## Halderman Declaration

Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 1177-1 Filed 09/21/21 Page 3 of 11

rather specific flaws in the ICX software, and I am prepared to demonstrate proof-of-concept malware that can exploit them to steal votes cast on ICX devices.

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, 2.0, February 10, 2021. P. 240  
“This requirement does not prohibit wireless hardware within the voting system so long as the hardware cannot be used e.g. no wireless drivers present.”

# “Unauthorized software on the voting systems

- “...additional software is known and there is a mechanism for the state to approve this...Microsoft SQL Management Studio...it’s a default package of the SQL Server download...it was not explicitly called out on the certification”

## Dominion Voting Systems Application for Certification, 5.11-CO

## 5.11-CO Test Report

### Microsoft.com

The download location for SQL Server depends on the edition:

- SQL Server Enterprise, Standard, and Express Editions are use. For the Enterprise and Standard Editions, contact your installation media. You can find purchasing information and partners on the [Microsoft licensing page](#).
- If you have a volume licensing agreement, for example an E you can download software from the [Volume Licensing Ser](#)
- [Free version - latest](#).
- [Free version - others](#).

Other SQL Server components can be found here:

- [All cumulative updates](#)
- [SQL Server Reporting Services](#)
- [SQL Server Management Studio](#)

### Democracy Suite 5.11-CO EMS Client Application Software Components

Software
Microsoft Windows 10
Microsoft Windows Server 2016
Microsoft SQL Server 2016
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.6.1
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable
Dallas 1-Wire Device Driver version 4.0.5 or newer
Adobe Reader DC or later

### COTS Hardware and Software

- EMS Standard Server Configuration
  - Microsoft Windows Server 2016
    - Microsoft SQL Server 2016 Standard
    - Server computer system per 2.02 *Democracy Suite System Configuration Overview*
- EMS Express Server Configuration
  - Microsoft Windows 10 Professional
    - Microsoft SQL Server 2016 Standard
    - Desktop computer system per 2.02 *Democracy Suite System Configuration Overview*
  - Client Workstation Configuration
    - Microsoft Windows 10 Professional
    - Desktop computer system per 2.02 *Democracy Suite System Configuration Overview*
- ❖ EMS COTS Software common to Standard and Express configurations
  - Microsoft .Net Framework 4.6.1
  - Microsoft .Net Framework 3.5
  - Microsoft IIS (part of the Windows installation, not a separate item)
  - Microsoft Visual J# 2.0
  - Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable
  - Dallas 1-Wire Device Driver version 4.0.5 or newer
  - RAID utility



# “the other one...is LibreOffice...”

- “...this is a freeware version of Office. Counties download this so they can have the Excel version of this to help them with reports. Colorado Election Rule 20.2 expressly allows counties to download additional software to their voting system server with approval from the Secretary of State’s office. ”

## 8 CCR 1505-1, Rule 20.2

The county may not install any software on any component of the voting system unless directed to, or approved by, the Secretary of State.

## 2002 VSS, para 1.6.1

After a system has completed qualification testing, further examination of a system is required if modifications are made to hardware, software, or telecommunications, including the installation of software on different hardware...

## CRS § 1-5-618

(1) After an electronic or electromechanical voting system has been certified by the secretary of state, a political subdivision may not adopt any modification of the system until the modification is certified or approved in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1.5) of this section by the secretary of state. A person desiring approval of a modification shall submit a written application for approval to the secretary of state...

(2) The requirements for approval of a modified electronic or electromechanical voting system are the same as those prescribed by this part 6 for the initial certification of the system

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# The Election System We Need

Component	Prevents		
	Fake Voters	Fake Ballots	Fake Counts
Start over: Local-controlled, clean voter rolls	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
In-person, election DAY voting w/gov. photo ID	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Precinct hand-count of numbered ballots under live-streamed, archived HD video		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Precincts certify and report vote count to precinct VOTERS, then Report certified count to counties			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Counties tally precinct counts ON VIDEO, report certified tally to voters/states			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
States tally counties' tallies, report/certify to voters			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

# What You Can Do

- **Share the evidence – demand public officials do their duty**
- **Tell County Commissioners you want to stop using black-box voting systems**
- **Affidavits – coming!**
- **Get involved – BFI Action Plan**

*Elections belong to US. WE must restore election integrity.*

# Join the Cause



<https://causeofamerica.org/concierge/>