

----- Original Message -----

On Thursday, March 24th, 2022 at 2:31 PM, CauseofAmerica <causeofamerica@protonmail.com> wrote:

Dear Colorado General Assembly,

On Tuesday, you received an email from Matt Crane, Executive Director of the Colorado County Clerk's Association. In his official capacity, Crane made a number of false assertions regarding the mounting evidence of illegality and irregularity in Colorado elections and election systems, and defamatory statements about the experts and citizens reporting that evidence. Some of Crane's false allegations repeat his prior private and public statements, and reveal a pattern of coordination with the public relations firm he cc'd on his message to you, his accomplices in the Colorado Secretary of State's office, and the media. Other false assertions Crane makes are new, and add to his discredit.

Purpose of Our Response

Thanks to Crane's injudicious approach to addressing his email, we citizens have the opportunity to respond directly to you, and we can assume the same privilege, as citizens, that Crane arrogates to himself in presuming the authority and knowledge to instruct you.

This message is intended to correct the record of Crane's lies and misinformation; we fear that, although multiple public officials in Colorado have had this information, it may have been kept from you.

There are two alarming aspects of Crane's official communication with you that require your immediate attention:

1. Crane admits to knowledge of explicit violations of Colorado election law, committed by the Secretary of State and her staff and, at her direction, by county election officials in Colorado. These are detailed below.
2. Crane's acknowledgment of "known vulnerabilities in the voting system" is noteworthy and significant. This acknowledgement deserves its own hearing before the General Assembly. At no previous time or place has Crane, much less the Secretary of State, acknowledged this fact which corroborates the Mesa County forensic expert reports. Secretary Griswold has also made no mention to members of the General Assembly, or to Colorado clerks, or to the public, of these facts.

Each violation of Colorado law must be investigated by sworn law enforcement personnel. If Crane's explicit indictment of the Secretary of State, and the evidence in the forensic reports are validated, each of these election officials must be afforded due process.

Given your duties under Colorado's Constitution – to pass laws to secure the purity of elections, and to guard against abuses of the elective franchise – we hope you will act with due diligence to properly inform yourselves, to consider the credibility and conflicts of interest of individuals and organizations which have been misleading you, and to act to fulfill your own sworn, lawful duties. **Now that you will have been given this information, directly, if you fail to act lawfully and diligently, the citizens will justifiably hold you accountable.**

You Have a Sworn Duty to Investigate

We have repeatedly responded to Mr. Crane, to refute his false claims and allegations, and have requested to publicly debate the CCCA Executive Director to resolve our conflicting understanding of the facts and his lack of evidence. Crane has never responded to these requests. We now respectfully request that you hold a formal hearing so we can have this debate before you, under oath and penalty of perjury.

You – and the citizens you represent – deserve to have the evidence laid before you so that you can decide for yourselves: **Who are the experts seeking the public good, and whom are the misleading, conflicted “grifters” and “bad actors.”**

**Sincerely -
Ashe Epp
Holly Kasun
Shawn Smith
Jeff Young**

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Matt Crane’s False Assertions

Our corrections to some of Crane’s most egregious false assertions, with our citations.

1. “Two of these reports are related to the election security breach in Mesa County”

No “security breach” in Mesa County has been proven; the Secretary of State has alleged a security breach through profuse public statements and social media posts, without evidence, including accusing Clerk Peters of compromising voting system Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) passwords which were in the sole care and custody of Secretary Griswold and her staff. In her rhetoric, the Secretary made false and unwarranted allegations against Clerks Klotz and Schroeder, for which she has not been held accountable. District Attorney Rubinstein has been in custody of ALL Mesa County evidence, including the voting systems, for seven months, and yet no one has been charged with any “security breach.”

2. “debunked as half-truths and outright falsehoods.”

Neither Crane nor Griswold have addressed the substance of the Mesa County forensic reports. Rather, they have simply repeated – through cooperative, uninformed media and without evidence – their unsupported, dismissive, false claims that the evidence has been “debunked.”

Further, they have engaged in attempted character assassination of Clerk Peters and the authors of these reports, such as the shockingly hypocritical labeling of the highly-credentialed experts as “grifters.” Crane has a degree in Political Science and History, to complement Griswold’s Bachelor of Arts and law degrees, and he is ignorantly disparaging the findings of:

- a. The former Chief Cyber Security Strategist for AT&T with a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, and Computer Security, numerous cyber security certifications, and over 40 years’ experience in cyber security.

b. A full-stack software engineer with Bachelor's degrees in Computer Science and Mathematics, with 40 years' experience in "big data" analysis, database management systems, and database development in some of the largest defense and industry corporations in the United States.

c. A computer consultant and Senior Lecturer Emeritus in Computer Science and Engineering at Texas A&M, with a Bachelor's degree in Mathematics, master's and doctor's degrees from Harvard (while attending on a Prize Fellowship from the National Science Foundation), who has consulted for major national and international firms and government agencies, who invented integrated user training within computer applications, who is the author of 26 published research articles on computer science and engineering, and who taught computer science and engineering for 37 years, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, programming and software design, and cyber-ethics.

Crane's email epitomizes the Dunning-Kruger effect.

3. "Not a single one incident of fraud or misconduct has been proven in these reports"

This is, at very least, extraordinarily misleading, if not an outright lie, since "proof" should come from thorough law enforcement investigation that has mysteriously and shamefully not been undertaken by either the State's Attorney General or the District Attorneys for Colorado judicial districts, all of which have been affected.

You must take interest, may see for yourselves, and should demand that Colorado's law enforcement officials investigate, evidence presented in support of the 14 major findings in the three reports:

a. [Mesa Forensic Report #1](#) major finding 1. "Election-Related data explicitly required to be preserved" (as described at [2002 Voting System Standards\(VSS\)](#), Vol 1, para 2.2.4.1, 2.2.5.3, 4.3, 4.4.3, and 6.5.5) "has been destroyed in violation of Federal and State law" (Preservation required by [52 U.S.C. § 20701](#) and [CRS § 1-7-802](#)).

Crane's claim that "...records required for retention under federal and state law come from the voting system itself, not the full computer operating system..." is, at least, stunningly (considering Crane's claim to expertise) inaccurate, likely intentionally deceptive and misleading, and demonstrably false.

Colorado's voting system vendors use self-described "COTS" hardware and software, and the 2002 VSS specifies audit log generation and retention requirements for COTS systems. The 2019 Dominion Voting Systems (DVS) [Final Application for Certification or Modification of a Voting System for Democracy Suite \(D-Suite\) 5.11-CO](#), the 2021 [Application for DVS D-Suite 5.13](#), the [2020 Test Report for Clear Ballot Group \(CBG\) ClearVote\(CV\) 2.1](#), and the [2021 Test Report for CBG CV 2.1.5](#), all identify "COTS" hardware and software, including computer operating systems, in our voting systems certified by the Secretary of State and used in 2020 and 2021 elections.

The [2002 VSS](#) para 2.2.5.3 explicitly states "Further requirements must be applied to COTS operating systems to ensure completeness and integrity of audit data for election software...These systems include both servers and workstations (or "PCs")...Election software running on these COTS systems is vulnerable to unintended effects from other user sessions, applications, and utilities, executing on the same platform at the same time as the election software...To counter these vulnerabilities, three operating system protections are required on all such systems on which election software is hosted..."

Second, operating system audit shall be enabled for all session openings and closings, for all connection openings and closings, for all process executions and terminations, and for the alteration or deletion of any memory or file object. This ensures the accuracy and completeness of election data stored on the system. It also ensures the existence of an audit record of any person or process altering or deleting system data or election data.”

b. [Mesa Forensic Report #1](#) major finding 2. “Due to non-compliance with the 2002 VSS requirements, these voting systems and accompanying vendor-provided, Colorado Secretary of State-approved procedures for county use cannot have met the certification requirements of the State of Colorado, and should not have been certified for use in the state.” The requirement, in the 2002 VSS, that voting systems generate and preserve all these log files, critical to the ability to audit and reproduce the conditions and details of election conduct, is mandatory under [CRS 1-5-601.5](#). Not only did the cyber expert conclude and show evidence that the DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO system did not satisfy those statutorily-mandated 2002 VSS requirements, but the Secretary of State falsely and illegally [certified](#) that it did.

c. [Mesa Forensic Report #2](#) major finding 1. The DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO voting system is not secure and protections have not been implemented in accordance with the 2002 VSS requirements. Again, the certification of a voting system which fails to comply with the requirements of the 2002 VSS is a clear violation of [CRS 1-5-601.5](#).

d. [Mesa Forensic Report #2](#) major finding 2. The combination of unauthorized software (Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS)) installed in the DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO Election Management System (EMS) server, the failure to employ security mechanisms built into the system and required by 2002 VSS, and the obliteration of mandatory audit logs (destruction of both election records and evidence of access to the EMS server) that Federal and State law require be preserved, create a “back-door” to the EMS server that is only partially protected by a simple password, with no preserved audit records.

Crane admits that SSMS “was not explicitly identified on the certification;” **this is tacit admission of the illegality of the installation and presence of SSMS on DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO.** He asserts, factually, that a single document, in DVS’ Technical Data Package (TDP) mentions “Microsoft Sequel Server Management Studio (SSMS).” Never mind that Crane presumes to advise you regarding computer-based voting systems, when he is so ignorant that he mistakes the acronym “SQL” (Structured Query Language) for the English word “sequel.” He fails to mention that the TDP comprises dozens of manuals, including eight manuals and user guides specific to the EMS, and not one of those eight mentions SSMS. More importantly, [CRS § 1-5-618](#) explicitly requires that any modification to the certified voting system, defined by DVS’ [application for certification](#), the corresponding [Test Report](#) (neither of which list SSMS as included or tested software), and the resulting Secretary of State [certification letter](#), be subjected to the same requirements for approval “as those prescribed by this part 6 for the initial certification of the system.”

Furthermore, Crane admits to his knowledge of the Colorado Department of State’s approval of a second, separate act (presumably with separate counts for each affected Colorado county) of **egregious violation of Colorado election law**, involving the installation of the “LibreOffice” freeware on Colorado voting systems. He cites, as justification, the Secretary of State’s Colorado Election [Rule 20.2 \(8 CCR 1505-1\)](#) but, again, fails to mention that the Secretary of State, herself, is not permitted to approve any

modification to Colorado voting systems except in accordance with state law. **LibreOffice software is not part of the specified or tested configuration of any voting system certified in Colorado.**

The introduction of untested, uncertified software – obtained from sources that have not been validated – by state or county officials with no cyber expertise, into Colorado voting systems, violates [CRS § 1-5-601.5](#), [CRS § 1-5-608.5](#), [CRS § 1-5-618](#), and [CRS § 1-5-620](#), causes counties to violate [CRS § 1-6-612](#) and [CRS § 1-5-613](#) by using an improperly certified voting system. There is no version of the LibreOffice software without at least one published [Common Vulnerability and Exposure](#), and some versions have nine published vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities of the most severe category.

The cavalier introduction of this software into voting systems reveals such blatant ignorance of and disregard for cyber hygiene and security that it should immediately disqualify any individual involved from every having custody or control of any election-related system. Further, the Secretary of State is in breach of her duty under [CRS § 1-5-621](#), for her failure to prohibit the use in elections of voting systems which, by the installation of untested, uncertified software, deviated from the certified system.

These are violations of Colorado election law, committed by the Secretary of State and her staff and, at her direction, by county election officials in Colorado. Each should be investigated by sworn law enforcement personnel and, if Crane's self-incrimination and indictment of the Secretary of State, and the evidence in the forensic reports, are validated, each of these election officials must be afforded due process.

- e. [Mesa Forensic Report #2](#) major finding 3. Testing by the cyber expert demonstrated that calculated vote totals in the DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO EMS tabulated vote database could “be easily changed,” “flipping the election,” and violating the 2002 VSS’ explicit requirement to address this specific risk. Once again, the certification of a voting system which fails to comply with the requirements of the 2002 VSS is a clear violation of [CRS 1-5-601.5](#).
- f. [Mesa Forensic Report #2](#) major finding 4. The DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO EMS server was assembled in Mexico, of parts manufactured in China, exposing the EMS server, and thus the voting system, to compromise through supply-chain attack. Despite this concept being [well-understood](#) in the Federal government, particularly within national security community personnel responsible for cyber security, the supply-chain threat is not mentioned nor in any way mitigated in the acquisition and testing of Colorado’s computer-based voting systems.
- g. [Mesa Forensic Report #2](#) major finding 5. Due to the demonstration of the EMS server’s vulnerability and susceptibility to manipulation, the EMS server presents an immediate threat to election integrity, with potential grave consequence to Colorado and the Nation by allowing the unauthorized alteration of election results. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 1. There was an unauthorized creation of new election databases on the EMS server during the November 2020 General Election in Mesa County, involving the digital “reloading” of 20,346 ballot records into the new election databases, making the original voter intent recorded from the paper ballots unknown. In addition, 5,567 ballots in 58 batches did not have their digital records copied to the new database, although the votes from the ballots in those batches were recorded in the EMS server’s main election database.

- h. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 2. The same unauthorized creation of new election databases occurred during the 2021 Grand Junction Municipal Election in March 2021 in Mesa County, followed by the digital reloading of 2,974 ballot records, obscuring original voter intent for those ballots, and 4,458 ballots in 46 batches did not have their digital records copied to the new database, despite the votes from the ballots in those ballots being included in the EMS server's main election database.
- i. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 3. Secure hash algorithm (.sha) files required for each digital ballot image were missing, making the authenticity and ballot-level records for those ballots impossible to verify.
- j. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 4. The true total vote count in Mesa County for those two elections **cannot be accurately calculated** from records in the databases of the county's voting system.
- k. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 5. There is no function or feature on the EMS server that could be executed inadvertently or deliberately by a local election official that would cause this combination of events to occur, especially within the time frame of the events. Given the complex sequence of data manipulations and deletions necessary to produce the digital evidence described in this report, this combination of events could not have been the result of either deliberate or inadvertent actions by those officials using documented EMS server functions.
- l. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 6. The installation of the Trusted Build update on the EMS server in May 2021, as directed by the Colorado Secretary of State, destroyed all data on the EMS hard drive, including the batch and ballot records that evidenced the creation of new databases and reprocessing of ballot records described in Findings 1 and 2 above.
- m. [Mesa Forensic Report #3](#) major finding 7. **The fact that such ballot record manipulation has been shown demonstrates a critical security failure with the DVS EMS wherever it is used.** The manipulation would not be identifiable to an election official using the voting systems, nor to an observer or judge overseeing the election conduct, much less to citizens with no access to the voting systems; without both cyber and database management system expertise, and unfettered access to database records and computer log files (many of which were destroyed by the actions of the Secretary of State) from the EMS server, the manipulation would be undetectable.

4. "Not one of these reports have shown any evidence that the results of the 2020 election or any other election were not accurate."

These reports show that the certification of our voting systems and their use in Colorado elections has been in violation of Colorado law, and that the extraordinary vulnerability of the voting systems to penetration and manipulation, coupled with the wanton destruction of election records, means that neither the results reported from these systems nor the election officials who swear to their security and integrity, can be trusted by Colorado citizens. The safeguards in CRS Title 1, which the General Assembly has presumably intended and assumed would protect the purity of Colorado elections and safeguard the elective franchise, have failed – through the ignorance and deliberate subversion of sworn election officials, and with the mute inaction of Colorado's sworn law enforcement officers, to Mr. Crane's ardent applause.

5. “Our systems specifically use redundant checks and rechecks to ensure that they are safe. Some of these protections include equipment-related security measures including restricted access and video monitoring, pre-election testing that includes community members as witnesses and post-election activities such as risk-limiting tabulation audits. Strict chain of custody, as demanded by Colorado statute/rule, adds significantly to our security posture.”

These computer-based voting systems are *computers*. Assessing their security and integrity requires cyber security expertise, not the rote memorization of narrative talking points Crane regurgitates for consumption by citizens and public officials who’ve mistakenly trusted him. **Crane’s claim belies the independent forensic assessment of cyber experts with more than 120 years’ more cyber experience than Crane.** What, precisely, does Crane suppose “video monitoring” will reveal, from the outside of a computer system?

Could “watching” your smartphone – even with a “bipartisan” team – prevent the delivery of a text message, or the suspension of your “blocked caller list” through a setting change which occurs automatically when one dials “9-1-1,” even after performing a “logic and accuracy test (LAT)” to ensure your phone blocked any calls from numbers on your “blocked caller list?” The same is true for our computer-based voting systems.

Both the approach to certification testing by the Voting System Testing Labs and the LAT performed by election officials are artifacts of an era when the proper function of mechanical or electromechanical voting systems could actually be verified by simple tests and the naked eye; these approaches are impossibly inadequate and ill-suited to the verification of computer-based voting system security and proper operation, because the operation, security, and integrity of a computer-based system can be radically altered with a single bit change in code or firmware.

6. “This flurry of reports is a deliberate strategy by grifters and bad actors to create the impression that something is wrong with our election systems, spread fear, and create chaos to achieve their policy goals, which include reducing voting to only one day, potentially disenfranchising our military voters and voters with a disability, and hand-counting ballots. Ironically, their “solutions” to achieve greater election integrity will actually have the opposite effect. Their solutions will decrease voter access to the ballot and make our elections less secure and less accurate.” Crane veers yet again into baseless, defamatory claims, from a position of such utter and abject ignorance and hypocrisy, it beggars belief.

Speaking of grifters, Crane himself was inexplicably absolved by an ethics review of conflict of interest, related to his conduct as a sworn county election official, while his spouse was employed by the vendor of the very voting system that he was responsible for ensuring was secure and accurate. Even his [curriculum vitae](#) is “embellished,” claiming that he was an elected clerk from 2013 through 2018, despite his status from 2013 through January, 2015 being “appointed,” not elected. In addition to his role with the CCCA, Crane is in the employ of the [Lafayette Group](#), a contracted crisis communications advisor to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), responsible, in part, for propaganda such as the ridiculous proclamation by election industry insiders that the November 2020 election was the “most secure in American history.” Crane invited his fellow Lafayette Group employee and former EAC director of testing and certification to address Colorado’s county clerks at the CCCA’s summer conference, sponsored by voting system vendors. Ryan Macias, who was caught attempting to sneak into the Maricopa County audit as an operative of Arizona Secretary of State Hobbs and, during the summer conference, informed CCCA attendees that his organization intended to discredit the Maricopa Audit before its report was released.

Now, though Crane and the CCCA pretend to represent the interest of Colorado county clerks, which

pay for their CCCA membership with Colorado citizens' tax dollars, he has funded a lobbyist, "5280 Strategies," to lobby in support of SB22-153. This bill would strip clerks and their citizens of significant statutory authorities to oversee elections. While claiming to represent the clerks, Crane has exposed himself and his confidants as allies of Secretary of State Griswold, in her campaign to consolidate absolute power over Colorado elections – depriving citizens of transparency and stripping clerks of their First Amendment rights to even express doubts regarding voting system security.

7. "The entirely erroneous assertion that the voting system testing lab used by Colorado lost its federal accreditation and thus the voting systems used in Colorado should be decertified as a result. Any assertion that the federally accredited voting system testing lab (VSTL) used by Colorado lost its federal accreditation is absolutely not true."

This is a lie. Colorado Department of State Elections Director Judd Choate lied to Colorado election officials in a memorandum [emailed](#) at 6:29PM on July 20, 2021, where Choate, as Crane has, claimed that "The EAC also has confirmed that Pro V&V's accreditation did not expire at any time between February 24, 2015 and today, July 20, 2021." His email went on to state "I have gone so far as to personally confirm this fact with the EAC Executive Director, Mona Harrington, two weeks ago (accreditation was not terminated) and again this morning (accreditation did not expire)."

In fact, at the time of Choate's memorandum, he had not yet received ANY documentation in response to his [plea](#) in the 12:01AM, July 20, 2021 [email](#) to EAC Executive Director Mona Harrington and EAC General Counsel Kevin Rayburn, for "any document you could point us to that would clarify the Revocation v. Expiration issue?" "Better yet," Choate continued, "could you write a letter or even an email stating what we all know – that Pro V&V was a continuously accredited VSTL since 2015?" At 10:08AM on July 20, 2021, Choate [wrote](#) "Our real concern at this point is about this idea that the accreditation 'expired.' The talking points seemed to have shifted from revocation of Pro V&V's accreditation to the expiration of that accreditation. Obviously, we know this isn't the case, but we lack the documentation to demonstrate that this talking point is in error." At 4:12PM, July 21, 2021, nearly 22 hours after lying to Colorado election officials, Choate [wrote](#) "Hi Mona. Attached is the memo I sent the counties last night. Any update on the letter you are providing?"

To be clear: at the time that Choate asserted to Colorado election officials that he had confirmed uninterrupted, unexpired accreditation with the EAC, he had received no such confirmation from the EAC.

In fact, [Title 52 U.S.C. § 20971](#) provides that VSTLs are accredited ONLY by vote of the EAC Commissioners, and the EAC's [Voting System Testing Laboratory Program Manual](#), para 3.8 states that "A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter...Laboratories that timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending...(and) should circumstances leave the EAC without a quorum to conduct the vote required under Section 3.5.5." This VSTL Program Manual language explicitly acknowledges that renewal of accreditation for a VSTL required, in accordance with 52 USC § 20971, **a vote by EAC Commissioners**, to be documented in the form of a written Commissioners' Decision which "makes a clear determination as to accreditation..."

The EAC issued a [Certificate of Accreditation](#) to Pro V&V on February 24, 2015, which states that the accreditation is effective through February 24, 2017. [EAC Annual Reports and Records of EAC Commissioner meetings](#) between 2014 and 2020 show that the EAC had a quorum of Commissioners continuously, excepting from March, 2018 through January, 2019, and that **at no**

time did EAC Commissioners vote to renew the accreditation of Pro V&V between 2017 and the end of 2020. By U.S. law, and in fact, Pro V&V was not an accredited VSTL in 2019 and 2020, at the time it conducted testing on the DVS D-Suite 5.11-CO and CBG CV 2.1 voting systems – which testing campaigns were also used as the partial basis of voting system standards compliance testing Pro V&V accomplished for [DVS D-Suite 5.13](#) and [CBG CV 2.1.5](#) in 2021, according to the test reports for those systems.

The [unsigned, undated memo](#) finally sent by EAC's Harrington (which does not, in contradiction to Choate's statement, mention, let alone dismiss, the question of whether Pro V&V's accreditation had expired, nor whether EAC Commissioners voted to renew Pro V&V's accreditation) notwithstanding, this means, undeniably, that Secretary of State Griswold's certifications of DVS D-Suite [5.11-CO](#) and [5.13](#), and CBG CV [2.1](#) and [2.1.5](#) voting systems were in violation of Colorado law.

8. “The false assertion that voting systems are built to connect to the internet. Yes, there is wireless technology on many of our voting system components. Voting systems are tested and certified for use by the federal government and the state of Colorado with these wireless components included. The mere presence of these components does not violate federal or state law. However, the wireless ability is disabled in Colorado as a part of the Trusted Build process. Counties do have the ability to validate this. Validating that wireless functionality is disabled will be a part of the Public Logic and Accuracy Test conducted before every election in every county moving forward.”

Whether by sheer ignorance or the deception of semantics, Crane pretends that the only issue with the inclusion of, for example, 36 separate wireless networking devices in a single county's voting system is whether that voting system is connected directly to the internet.

In Mesa County Forensics [Report #2](#), Doug Gould explains the concept of an Island-Hopping Attack, such that the connection or susceptibility to connection, e.g. through a wireless networking device, of a voting system to any external device or network exposes the voting system to attack. “Internet” or “no internet” is irrelevant. There is no amount of wireless connectivity that could be tolerable, acceptable, or safe in a system as critical as our voting systems. The inclusion of ANY wireless networking device in a voting system introduces such an extraordinary vulnerability that the fact of Crane's dismissal of this concern reinforces the conclusion that he, and anyone who thinks as he does, cannot be trusted with our elections. **The Federal government [will not allow](#) wireless devices of any kind in its most sensitive facilities, and states explicitly that “computers with an embedded wireless system must have the radio removed before the computer is used to transfer, receive, store, or process classified information, and “simply disabling the transmit capability is...inadequate...”** But Crane insists that the “Trusted Build” and the “Logic and Accuracy Test” “validate that wireless functionality is disabled.”

In fact, Crane's ignorance fails him, and us, once again. The presence of integrated Dell Remote Access Controllers (iDRAC) and the use of Intel chipsets with forms of “[Active Management Technology\(AMT\)](#)” in our voting systems means that our voting systems are, inherently and irrevocably, built for remote access and out-of-band management – even allowing the configuration of the systems remotely with no detectable indicators to personnel standing in front of or even using those computers. When paired with wireless networking devices, inexplicably included in the voting systems by the vendor, and completely [untested](#) by the VSTL, what is clear is that we are, at best, poorly advised and, at worst, intentionally deceived by Crane and Griswold.

9. “Also issued recently by... “USEIP” is an attempt to report on what they describe as a ‘voter canvass’....In general, it is impossible to respond specifically to any of its assertions because we know too little about the canvas itself.”

Legislators can read the [Colorado Canvassing Report](#) and decide for themselves the value of the product of almost 8,000 volunteer hours by hundreds of their constituents, resulting in affidavits which document, conservatively, an 8% irregularity and inaccuracy rate in the Secretary of State's voting history and voter records for the November 2020 election in four large Colorado counties, indicating that the outcome of 7-12% of all election races and measures on Colorado's November 2020 ballots may be in doubt.

As to Crane's questions, which he has never directed to USEIP despite the public posting of the report and the availability of USEIP's contact information, as well as an information video answering most of these questions:

3. "Who are the canvassers?" The canvassers were 100% volunteer, non-partisan, Colorado citizens canvassing (using the standard dictionary definition which suddenly mystifies Crane) their neighbors.
4. "How did the canvassers interact with the voters?" The canvassers were only allowed to canvass following their training that emphasized courtesy, honesty, and friendliness, and they worked in pairs for their own safety.
5. "Did the canvassers use a script? Was the script biased?" As explained in the Report, page 5, the canvassers used a script and asked five questions:
6. Did you vote in the November 2020 elections
7. By what means did you return your ballot (mail-in, ballot drop box, or in-person)
8. Did you receive any extra ballots at this address
9. Is your voter information (in the Secretary of State's information) accurate (name, address, party affiliation, etc.)
10. Are there any other experiences you would like to share.
11. "What voters were surveyed?" As explained in the Report, page 6, all voters in precincts with the highest and lowest voter opportunity scores were canvassed. Additionally, as specified in a supplemental report footnoted on page 20 (and found here: <https://ln5.sync.com/dl/e817b9880/hwtchqgx-7tag86gk-r6x8yngc-sg5zimwp>), the distribution of the voter opportunity scores for voters that responded versus didn't respond were approximate, indicating that voters who responded were similar to that of the voters who did not respond.
12. "How did they overcome the bias of talking to only one person in a house with multiple voters?" Crane here assumes, without evidence, that there IS such a bias. As noted above, the distribution of the voter opportunity scores for voters that responded versus didn't respond were very similar, indicating that voters who responded were similar to the voters who did not respond. This is important because it confirms that there was no bias in the sample selection, nor in the response rate of voters.
13. "Are the neighborhoods surveyed representative of the county?" Yes. When you inspect the distribution of the voter opportunity score for those neighborhoods canvassed in each county, they approximate the distribution of the voter opportunity scores for all voters in each of the counties canvassed. You can find additional information here: <https://ln5.sync.com/dl/bd2485d10/aru766hi-t322kdbn-cww7jwsj-5yf8znds>
14. "Are the counties surveyed representative of the state? (Obviously Douglas, El Paso, Pueblo, and Weld are not representative of the entire state)" Here, again, Crane reveals his *own* bias, with no evidence. Regardless, the distribution of voter opportunity scores among the four large counties canvassed approximates the distribution for all of Colorado, hence, we can infer that these counties can be used as a proxy for the state. You can find additional information here: <https://ln5.sync.com/dl/bd2485d10/aru766hi-t322kdbn-cww7jwsj-5yf8znds>

15. "Why were results from other counties not included in the report?" The sheer temerity of Crane – who has publicly asserted warrantless falsehoods regarding Colorado elections, and yet made no effort to canvass; who has disparaged the citizen canvassers and their results; who has pretended that the very term "canvass" is somehow deserving of skepticism – asking "Why didn't the citizens do MORE?" is shocking. Again, while no Colorado election official conducted any canvassing, of any amount, to satisfy their sworn duty, these hundreds of citizen volunteers spent nearly 8,000 hours canvassing samples populations of four counties, representing approximately one-fourth of the entire Colorado registered voting population. As noted above, given that the distribution of voter opportunity scores in these four counties approximates the distribution of the entire state, inferences can be made about discrepancies found. You can find additional information here: <https://ln5.sync.com/dl/bd2485d10/aru766hi-t322kdbn-cww7jwsj-5yf8znds>
16. "Furthermore," Crane continues, "it's fair to ask why USEIP has not turned over the data and/or affidavits that support their claims. If they have evidence of poor voter rolls and illegal activity, they should have turned that information over to be investigated when they released their report. If the information is accurate, having the data would allow counties to update voter rolls and pursue legal charges if warranted."

Is it, in fact, fair for Crane to ask, given his baseless claims and utter inaction to support them? The report literally states, on page 7, that "affidavits and accompanying data will be provided to officials." And so they will be. The report has already been provided to the lead counsel for plaintiff in a suit against Secretary of State Griswold concerning Colorado voter rolls. The report and affidavits will be provided directly to the Colorado Attorney General and District Attorneys, and to County Clerks, with affidavits which compel their investigation, "forthwith," under Colorado statute.

10. "One other important thing to note," Crane's claim that "USEIP members collected a list of approximately 750 deceased people who they claim had cast a ballot in the 2020 General Election. They submitted this list to authorities in El Paso County last year..." is, par for his consistently inaccurate course, completely false. USEIP volunteers did no such thing. In addition to cyber security and Colorado election law and canvassing, it appears Crane is incapable of validating even the simplest of his counter-factual claims. This man cannot possibly be a "trusted source" of information for our elected officials.

11. "We understand a new report regarding the Mesa County election security breach has just been introduced. We will study that report vigorously as well. Based on the poor assumptions/conclusions from the first two reports, it is fair to say we are cynical about any claims in this new report. "

Crane's cynicism must be a badge of honor for any recipient, given that his "vigorous study" (it's unclear who he refers to by "we") has thus far resulted in an unbroken chain of inaccurate and deceptive assertions in every single case. Perhaps Crane will "vigorously" study Mesa Forensic Report #3 sufficiently that he will not publicly embarrass himself by asking question answered in the first five pages of the report.

12. "In closing, these reports detail known vulnerabilities in the voting system."

Crane's acknowledgment of "known vulnerabilities in the voting system" is noteworthy and significant. The acknowledgement deserves its own hearing before the General Assembly. At no previous time or place has Crane, much less the Secretary of State, acknowledged this fact. Secretary Griswold has also made no mention to members of the General Assembly, or to Colorado clerks, or to the public, of vulnerabilities discovered in

Colorado's Statewide Colorado Registration and Election (SCORE) system in [2015](#) and [2020](#), nor of the explicit statement in University of Michigan Professor of Computer Science and election system security expert witness J. Alex Halderman's [Declaration](#) in a Georgia court of "numerous security vulnerabilities" in the DVS ImageCastX machines used in 16 states, including Colorado, which can be used to "steal votes cast on ICX devices. Notice of the Halderman Declaration was provided to the Colorado Secretary of State prior to the November 2021 election, but she took no action to notify the General Assembly, Colorado election officials, or the Colorado public, nor did she take any action to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities.

13. "However, they do not show any exploitation of those vulnerabilities. They do not detail any fraud or inaccurate vote counts."

Crane should have waited until after he "vigorously" read Mesa County Forensic Report #3, rather than simply after an entire career of not actually looking to see if voting system vulnerabilities have been exploited, before making this baseless assertion.

14. "Amateur and inaccurate work like this undermines public trust in our elections and hurts the integrity of our elections."

Please look at the credentials of the authors of these Reports, as noted above.

As it turns out, our elections, and the people who have been keeping these election vulnerabilities from the public, do not deserve public trust. They deserve scrutiny, and the People are entitled to demand it, and the members of the General Assembly are obligated by law and oath to provide it.